INTRODUCTION:
The following documents collected from NARA are from the period of the late 1940's through the early 1950's. Particularly important is the period after 1949 when the ROC moved its central government to Taiwan -- a territory still under Japanese sovereignty.
As the excerpts from these documents clearly show, the United States government has never recognized the incorporation of "Formosa and the Pescadores" (aka Taiwan) into the territory of China. This is further explained as follows:
(a) The United States did not recognize that Taiwan had been incorporated into the territory of China upon the surrender of Japanese troops, at the close of fighting in WWII in the Pacific.
(b) Preliminary drafts of the Japanese Peace Treaty (aka San Francisco Peace Treaty or "SFPT") offered several different scenarios for the disposition of Taiwan, including a decision by the Big Four of the Pacific (the United States, Great Britain, China and Russia), referral to the United Nations General Assembly, return to Japan, a United Nations Trusteeship, outright cession to the ROC or PRC, etc.
(c) President Truman's statement of June 27, 1950 was consistent with all Executive Branch documentation up to that time.
(d) In what came to be the final wording for SFPT Article 2b, in the versions of the treaty drafted in early to mid-1951, no "receiving country" was specified for the territorial cession of Taiwan.
(e) Under international law, Taiwan was Japanese territory until ceded in the SFPT, effective April 28, 1952. From 1952 to the present, Taiwan's status has been considered undetermined, and not part of the territory of China.
Office/Agency: Dept. of State
title: Memorandum of Conversation
date: Feb. 16, 1949
quote: [General MacArthur] pointed out that the situation in the Far East at present made it impossible to conclude a peace treaty much as we would have wished to have had one by this time. I [Max W. Bishop, Chief, Division of Northeast Asian Affairs] gathered that General MacArthur felt that it is impossible or undesirable to attempt to forsee a date when a peace treaty can be concluded.
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: ? ?
title: Alternative Procedures which might be followed with respect to the Question of a Japanese Peace Settlement
date: June 6, 1949
item: Legal Situation
quote: Within the framework of the basic documents relating to the occupation, there is considerable leeway for substantially accomplishing many of our objectives with respect to Japan without additional FEC policy decisions.
With regard to territorial provisions, we are now in military occupation of the Ryukyus, the Bonins, and Volcanos and Marcus Island. We could continue to remain in occupation of these areas, could institute a civilian form of government in the islands, establish bases or take similar steps which would give clear indication of our intention that the islands shall remain under US control. We could not of course take any steps with respect to the permanent disposition of the Kuriles or Formosa.
quote: In so far as our occupation forces are concerned the occupation of Japan is now carried almost exclusively by American forces. We could gradually reduce these occupation forces by withdrawing them from the main islands or stationing them on Okinawa or other appropriate location outside the main islands of Japan. ...
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: ? ?
title: Statement of Principles Regarding a Japanese Peace Treaty
subject: Territory
date: ? ?
item: 3
quote: Japan would (a) recognize the independence of Korea; (b) agree to U.N. trusteeship, with the U.S. as administering authority, of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands, and (c) accept the future decision of the U.K., U.S.S.R., China and U.S. with reference to the status of Formosa, Pescadores, South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. In the event of no decision within a year after the Treaty came into effect, the U.N. General Assembly would decide.
quote: Since the proposed peace treaty will have much to do with determining Japan's place in the deomcratic world, we venture to express our concern particularly with the following points:
item: I (b) Question of the Restoration of the Kurile Islands
quote: One of the basic principles of the United States for the peace treaty with Japan, it has been reported, is this: "The fate of the former Japanese holdings such as Formosa, Southern Sakhalin, the Pescadores and the Kurile islands should be settled by the Big Four of the Pacific -- the United States, Great Britain, China and Russia. If they could not agree within a year after the treaty was signed, the matter would be referred to the United Nations General Assembly for decision."
In the Cairo Declaration, we note "that all the territories that Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores, shall be restored to the Republic of China." The Yalta Agreement had a clause stating: "the former rights of Russia violated by the treacherous attack of Japan in 1904 shall be restored." . . . . .
Granting the capture of Manchuria by the Japanese military clique as a fact, the imputation that "Japan stole Formosa and the Pescadores" and the placing upon Japan of the responsibility for causing the Russo-Japanes War, which Japan prosecuted with the financial and moral support of the United States and Great Britain, are "travesties of history."
The question of the restoration of Formosa and the Pescadores to China, as decided by the Cairo Declaration, based upon historically inaccurate assumptions, should be rationally re-examined either by the Big Four or by the General Assembly of the United Nations.
Availing ourselves of this opportunity, we desire to add the following with regard to the administration of Formosa as carried out by Japan:
The administration of Formosa, as carried out by Japan with incressant efforts for the peace and welfare of the inhabitants, is claimed by world scholars in colonial administration to be an outstanding achievement worthy of special praise in the history of colonization. If Formosa is to be placed under the United Nations, we desire to point out that Japan has the foremost qualifications for its trusteeship and we are confident that the islanders would welcome the choice of Japan.
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: (Dept. of State)
title: Discussion of Far Eastern Affairs in Preparation for Conversations with Mr. Bevin
date: Sept. 13, 1949
quote: The Secretary [of State] inquired what we should do about Formosa. Mr. Jessup suggested the possibility of a United Nations commission if Chiang Kai-shek could be persuaded to ask for it. Mr. Merchant declared the British were defeatists on this subject and felt that referring the matter to the U.N. would do more harm than good. Mr. Rusk urged that we at least approach Chiang on the matter and pointed out that U.S. opinion will demand some action by this Government on the Formosa question short of military intervention. The Secretary was doubtful whether the reference to the U.N. would be successful. He felt it might only show off the weakness of the United Nations. Ambassador Stuart pointed out the danger of inflaming anti-United States sentiment in China by our stand on Formosa. Mr. Merchant expressed doubt that Chiang would make any substantial concessions in view of the fact that he expects shortly war between the United States and Russia.
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: ? ?
title: Provisional Comments of the Secretary of State on Mr. Dulles' Proposals
subject: (Japanese Peace Treaty)
date: ? ?
quote: (iii) If it is impossible to indicate precisely in the treaty the disposal of Formosa and the Pescadores, some formula must be devised to define their provisional status after Japan's renunciation of sovereignty.
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: Dept. of State
title: Memorandum of Conversation
subject: General MacArthur's Views on a Japanese Peace Treaty
date: November 2, 1949
item: 8. Formosa
quote: General MacArthur considers it of the greatest importance that Formosa not fall under Communist control. He does not believe it essential that we control the island, but believes that "by hook or by crook" we must keep it out of Communist hands. When Mr. Butterworth observed that this view was wedely shared but that the "hook or crook" was difficult to devise, Colonel Babcock stated that General MacArthur had no suggestions on this point. The General thought that, rather than permit Formosa to go to the Communists, it would be better to return it to Japan.
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
People's Republic of China The government of China set up in 1949 after the victory of the communist forces of Mao Zedong. The People's Republic ruled the mainland of China, forcing the government of Nationalist China into exile on the island of Taiwan. For years, many Western nations, especially the United States, refused to recognize the People's Republic as the government of mainland China; instead, they exchanged ambassadors only with Nationalist China. The United States recognized the People's Republic as the government of China in 1979.
(
source: the bartleby website, quoting from --
The New Dictionary of Cultural Literacy, Third Edition, 2002. http://www.bartleby.com/59/13/peoplesrepub.html )
Republic of China government in exile
quote: Enmeshed in a civil war between the Nationalists and the Communists for control of China, Chiang's government mostly ignored Taiwan until 1949, when the Communists won control of the mainland. That year, Chiang's Nationalists fled to Taiwan and established a government-in-exile.
(
source: Introduction to Sovereignty: A Case Study of Taiwan, Stanford Program on International and Cross-Cultural Education, published 2004.)
quote: After the war China established a garrison on Itu Aba, which the Chinese Nationalists maintained after their exile to Taiwan.
(
source: Encyclopedia Britannica http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9069237/Spratly-Islands )
quote: Chiang Kai-shek born October 31, 1887, Chekiang province, China died April 5, 1975, Taipei, Taiwan
soldier and statesman, head of the Nationalist government in China from 1928 to 1949, and subsequently head of the Chinese Nationalist government in exile on Taiwan.
(
source: Encyclopedia Britannica http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9023957/Chiang-Kai-shek )
Documents on the International Status of Taiwan
http://homepage.usask.ca/~llr130/ctir1/ctir1.pdf
Edited with Analysis and Commentary by Marc J. Cohen and Emma Teng, Center for Taiwan International Relations, Washington, D.C., 1990
Quotes:
Office/Agency: SCAP, General Douglas MacArthur
date: June 14, 1950
title: Memorandum on Formosa
quote: 6. Historically Formosa has been used as a springboard for military aggression directed against areas to the south. The most notable and recent example was the utilization of Formosa by the Japanese in World War II. At the outbreak of the Pacific War in 1941, Formosa played an important part as a staging area and supporting base for the various Japanese invasion convoys. The main strength of the forces which landed at Lingayen Gulf on Luzon were staged from Keelung, Takao, and the Pescadores. The supporting air forces of Japan's army and navy were based on fields situated along Southern Formosa at Takao, Koshun, and Taichu. Takao also served as a staging area for the invasion of Java in February 1942. From 1942 through 1944 Formosa was a vital link in the transportation and communications chain which stretched from Japan through Okinawa and the Philippines to Southeast Asia. In 1944-45 Formosa was the key staging point for troops and air reinforcements deployed to the Philippines in
preparation for the all-important operation to hold the Philippine areas. As the United States carrier forces advanced into the Western Pacific, the air bases on Formosa assumed an increasingly greater role in the defense scheme of the Japanese. After the invasion of Luzon in January 1945 the Japanese air forces withdrew to Formosan fields to take up forward operational positions to be used against our advancing forces. The military utility of Formosa is sharply underlined by the fact that Japan in 1941 controlled not only the Ryukyus but the entire eastern periphery of China.
7. In addition to its military value, Formosa has not only been self-sufficient as regards food for its own population of more than eight million but it has exported since 1910 with a favorable balance of external trade. ...
8. Formosa represents a political area of no less importance to western ideology than other areas in the Orient. The Taiwanese are a homogeneous racial group who as individuals have resisted the intrusion of foreign blood. Although Formosa was promised to China as a consequence of World War II this promise was given in consonence with a political situation entirely different than that which now exists. ...
9. There can be no doubt that the eventual fate of Formosa largely rests with the United States. ...
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: White House, President Harry S. Truman
date: June 27, 1950
title: status of Formosa
quote: The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations.
(
source: news reports)
Office/Agency: ? ?
title: Secret
subject: (Japanese Peace Treaty)
date: Aug. 7, 1950
quote: On the theory that circumstances may make it desirable to act expeditiously to bring about peace with Japan on the basis of a simple Treaty, Mr. Allison and I [Mr. Dulles] have drawn up the annexed as a possible alternative to the long form previously circulated, and on which we should appreciate your comments.
5. Japan accepts whatever decision may hereafter be agreed upon by the United States, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and China, with reference to the future status of Formosa, the Pescadores, Sakhalin south of 50 degrees north latitude and the Kurile Islands. In the event of failure in any case to agree within one year, the parties of this treaty will accept the decision of the United Nations General Assembly.
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: Dept. of State
title: (Memorandum)
subject: Legal Status of Formosa
Reference: Mr. Ringwalt's letter of July 19, 1950
date: August 14, 1950
quote: As you know there is considerable cogitation at this time regarding all aspects of Formosa and further developments in thinking on the particular subject of the legal status of Formosa may be logically expected. The following comments are offered at this time, however, for their suggestive character.
The primary discussion of importance in this connection is, of course, the Cairo Declaration of 1943. As a consequence, by my recollection, in 1944 as a result of the work of a policy planning committee in the Department it was decided that Formosa should be handed over to the Chinese National Government immediately following upon the termination of hostilities. .... I believe that the immediate administrative act affecting the turnover was a military order handing it over to Chinese administration after the surrender of Japan.
From the legal standpoint, of course, title could hardly pass prior to determination of the matter by peace treaty with Japan, the Cairo Declaration being merely a statement of intent. The Cairo Declaration, however, was subsequently given added strength by joining of Soviet and Chinese agreement to it. The argument, therefore, that the provision of the Cairo treaty is nullified by any act of the Chinese Communist Party, who are alleged to have "proclaimed treaties made with foreign powers by the 'traitor' Chiang Kai-shek to be null and void" is not necessarily valid. ....
.... As you know the President's statement of June 27 implied that the legal position of Formosa might require reconsideration. This particularly in the light of current political developments which have introduced into the situation fundamental changes from the political situation existing at the time of the Cairo Declaration. Particularly tere has come into being the United Nations. The formalization of the transfer remains still to be completed by the signature of a peace treaty with Japan -- and it is appropriate to remark that several of the concerned powers may have changed their opinions substantially regarding the matter in the years intervening since the Cairo Declaration. It is more and more being considered desirable in the existing circumstances that there be taken some plebiscite of Formosan opinion respecting the future form of government and allegiance in Formosa, with the several following alternatives suggesting themselves:
(1) Allegiance to Japan,
(2) Allegiance to China (regardless of political complexion),
(3) Immediate independence, or
(4) A UN trusteeship for a stipulated period of years looking toward ultimate independence.
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: ? ?
subject: Japanese Peace Treaty
date: Aug. 18, 1950
from: Mr. Dulles
title: Draft (Aug. 19, 1950)
quote: The United States proposes a treaty with Japan which would end the state of war, restore Japanese sovereignty and bring Japan back as an equal in the society of free peoples. The Treaty would deal with the following specific topics:
2. Japan would (a) recognize the independence of Korea; (b) agree to U.N. trusteeship, with the U.S. as administering authority, of the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands and (c) accept the future decision of the U.K., U.S.S.R., China and U.S. with reference to status of Formosa, Pescadores, South Sakhalin and the Kuriles. In the event of no decision within a year after the Treaty came into effect the U.N. General Assembly would decide.
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: US Executive Branch
title: Statement to United Nations Security Council
re: President Truman's Directions to the Seventh Fleet on June 27
subject: United States Position
date: Aug. 25, 1950
quote: "The action of the United States was expressly to be without prejudice to the future political settlement of the status of the island. The actual status of the island is that it is territory taken from Japan by the victory of the allied forces in the Pacific. Like other such territories, its legal status cannot be fixed until there is international action to determine its future. The Chinese Government was asked by the allies to take the surrender of the Japanese forces on the Island. That is the reason the Chinese are there now."
(
source: Starr Memorandum, July 13, 1971)
Office/Agency: Departments of State and Defense
title: Japanese Peace Settlement Memorandum for the President
date: Sept. 7, 1950
quote: The Secretaries of State and Defense have agreed on the following points with respect to a Peace Treaty with Japan.
4. It is agreed that the Department of State should undertake confidential preliminary discussions through the diplomatic channel with friendly powers on the Far Eastern Commission with a view to ascertaining whether they would generally favor the type of treaty desired by the United States and how they would propose to proceed. ....
5. After the initial discussions with the friendly powers and at a time to be determined by the Secretary of State in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, a U.S. political representative will go to Japan to discuss confidentially with General MacArthur the proposed treaty and by arrangements through and in cooperation with General MacArthur will discuss the proposed treaty with the Japanese Government and also seek a procedure for Japanese participation in the treaty-making process wihich will assure genuine acceptance by the representaties of all important non-Communist political groups in Japan.
6. During the course of the above-mentioned discussions the treaty should be discussed informally with members of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees.
7. After preliminary discussions have been completed in accordance with the above procedures the Departments of State and Defense will consult with a view to making detailed recommendations to the President and the National Security Council as to the next steps to be taken.
8. At an appropriate time to be determined by the Department of State a public announcement will be made designed to make clear the agreement of the United States Government on the necessity of proceeding with preparations for a Treaty and the fact that discussions through the diplomatic channel are underway. The text of this announcement will be agreed with the Department of Defense.
It is recommended that the President give his approval to the above and that the Secretary of State immediately take the necessary steps to carry out these recommendations.
Signed:
Dean Acheson, Secretary of State Louis Johnson, Secretary of Defense
Approved: Harry S. Truman, Sept. 8, 1950
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: ? ?
title: Secret
subject: (further draft of Japanese Peace Treaty)
date: Sept. 11, 1950
quote: A further draft of September 11, 1950 has been made of a possible text of Japanese Peace Treaty to serve as a basis for further consideration and informal discussion with friendly members of the FEC. A copy of this new draft is appended hereto. It reflects certain of the points of view put forward by the Defense Establishment and certain further thoughts from within the Department since the circulation of the prior draft of August 18, 1950.
quote: .... 5. Japan accepts whatever decision may hereafter be agreed upon by the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union, China, and the United States with reference to the future status of Formosa, the Pescadores, Sakhalin south of 50 degrees north latitude and the Kurile Islands. In the event of failure in any case to agree within one year from the effective date of this treaty, the parties to this Treaty will seek and accept the recommendation of the United Nations General Assembly.
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: US Executive Branch
title: Request for Placement on the Agenda of the Fifth Session of the United Nations General Assembly
subject: The Question of Formosa
date: Sept. 20, 1950
quote: By a letter dated September 20, 1950, the United States requested that the question of Formosa be placed on the agenda of the fifth session of the UN General Assembly. In an explanatory note of September 21, the United States, citing the Cairo and Potsdam Declarations and the Japanese surrender, stated nevertheless:
"Formal transfer of Formosa to China was to await the conclusion of peace with Japan or some other appropriate formal act."
That note also stated:
"The Government of the United States has made it abundantly clear that the measures it has taken with respect to Formosa were without prejudice to the long-term political status of Formosa, .... "
(
source: Starr Memorandum, July 13, 1971)
Office/Agency: Dept. of State
title: Memorandum of Conversation
subject: Japanese Peace Treaty
date: Oct. 23, 1950
quote: In answer to his [Mr. Daridan, French Embassy] question whether our position on Formosa did not constitute a departure from the terms of the Cairo Agreement I [Mr. Fearey, NA] replied that the circumstances had changed greatly since that time, and that the results of the General Assembly's conisderation of the Formosa problem would doubtless have an important bearing on our and other countries' final position on the question.
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: (Dept. of State)
title: Memorandum to the Secretary from Mr. Dulles
date: Dec. 8, 1950
subject: Memorandum on Japan
quote: Japan is, with Germany, one of the two great assets that the Soviet power seeks for exploitation in aid of its aggressive policies. It is important, if practicable, to prevent that. However, recent developments in Korea make it doubtful whether Japan can be relied upon to form a dependable part of the non-communist world. It is important to seek to resolve that doubt in our favor.
Accepting this as a premise, the following course of action is sugested:
1. There should be a prompt effort definitely to commit Japan, spiritually and politically, to the cause of the free world. .....
2. ... Any such commitment by Japan would probably involve, in general, a basic decision by the U.S. to seek to maintain and defend the island chain of Japan, Ryukus, Formosa, and the Phillippines, and in particular, a certain commitment to Japan in terms of sea and air power; certain economic asurances and a prompt restoration of Japanese sovereignty through a treaty of peace or a declaration of peace.
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: (Dept. of State)
title: Draft Reply to Soviet Aide-Memoire of November 20, 1950 on Japanese Peace Treaty
date: Dec. 19, 1950
quote: 1. ... It is the view of the Government of the United States that the Declaration by United Nations of January 1, 1942 was a pledge by each of the signatories to carry the war-time efforts through to victory, and did not give any nation a perpetual power of veto over the conslusion of peace with Japan, which, since defeat, has for over five years complied loyally with the agreed terms of surrender.
2. The Soviet Government requests an interpretation of the proposal of the United States concerning Formosa, the Pescadores, the southern part of Sakhalin Island, and the Kurile Islands, in the light of the Cairo Declaration and the Yalta Agreement.
The Cairo Declaration was a statement of purpose to restore "Manchuria, Formosa, and the Pescadores" to the Republic of China. It has never been the intention of the United States, by reason of the Cairo Declaration, to exclude consideration in a final settlement of all relevant factors. Among such factors may be noted the views of other Allies who were not consulted at Cairo, and any relevant principles of the United Nations Charter.
With regard to the Yalta Agreement, the United States Government has remained consistently of the opinion that the territorial provisions of this Agreement would be subject to final confirmation in a treaty of peace with Japan ...
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: Dept. of State
title: Memorandum of Conversation
subject: Japanese Peace Treaty
date: Dec. 21, 1950
quote: Madame Pandit [Indian Ambassador] called to give the initial reactions of the Indian Government to the United States memorandum on a Japanese peace treaty.
... Madame Pandit made clear that India believes that Formosa and the Pescadores should be returned to China and that this means Communist China. Mr. Dulles said that it might be possible for the treaty merely to require renunciation by Japan of any claims to Formosa and the Pescadores, leaving open the final determination of the status of the islands in question.
... Madame Pandit made clear that these were India's preliminary views which were being tentatively presented for United States consideration.
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: (Dept. of State)
title: Japanese Peace Settlement
date: Jan. 16, 1951
quote: 1. On September 14, 1950 President Truman announced that the U.S. Government believed that an effort should again be made to achieve agreement on a Japanese peace settlement and that he had authorized the Department of State to initiate informal discussions in the matter, in the first instance with those Governments represented on the FEC.
2. The following day Mr. John Foster Dulles, Consultant to the Secretary in charge of the treaty project, held a background press conference. ....
3. In the course of the 1950 General Assembly Mr. Dulles and Mr. Allison, Director of the Office of Northeast Asian Affairs, outlined U.S. views on the substantive and procedural problems of a treaty to representatives of all of th Far Eastern Commission countries and to Indonesia. Our views were given to the Ambassador of Ceylon in late December. ....
4. By mid-January 1951 formal responses to our approach had been received only from the Soviet, Chinese and Indian Governments. The Soviet reply of Nov. 20, while phrased as a request for clarification of our views, took issue with the U.S. on all the more important treaty issues, and was clearly designed as a propaganda instrument. It was contended that USSR and Communist China must be parties to the treaty, that the disposition of Formosa and the Pescadores, Southern Sakhalin and the Kuriles had been determined at Cairo and Yalta, and that there was no basis in these documents for a U.S. trusteeship over the Ryukyus and Bonins. Assurances were requested that the occupation forces would all be withdrawn within a period of months after the treaty, that the recreation of Japanese armed forces would be forbidden, and that no U.S. military "bases" would be retained in Japan. The U.S. in its reply of Dec. 28 rejected the view that one or two nations should be
permitted to hold up a peace settlement with Japan indefinitely until the document met their particular views. It went on to state that the territorial provisions of Cairo and Yalta were subject to confirmation in the peace settlements, where the views of other Allies and obligations subsequently assumed in the United Nations Charter should be taken into account; .... On December 4 the Foreign Minister of the People's Republic of China issued a statement strongly attacking the U.S. seven-point statement of principles.
The Chinese Ambassador informed Mr. Dulles on December 19, [1950] that his Government was in general accord with the U.S. treaty views. He said that it accepted the security provisions contemplated and establishment of a U.S. trusteeship over the Ryukyu and Bonin Islands. The Chinese Government was prepared to make no reparations claims provided all other nations did the same. It was the Ambassador's understanding that even though the future disposition of Formosa was left unsettled Japan would renounce its title to Formosa in the treaty.
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Notes:
(a) The Chinese Ambassador to the United States from 1946 to 1956 was Mr. Wellington Koo.
Office/Agency: Department of State
title: Memorandum of Conversation
date: Feb. 12, 1951
quote: ... The conversation then turned to territorial and security problems and President Quirino emphasized the deep interest of his country in the future of Formosa and expressed disagreement with what he understood would be the United States' position that the future of Formosa should be determined in the first instance by only the Big Four. President Quirino intended that the Philippines should be a part to any determination of the future of Formosa and that in his opinion some form of United Nations trusteeship might be the most satisfactory solution. Mr. Dulles stated that the original position of the United States had been tentative only; that the United States would certainly wish to consider carefully the views of the Philippine Government on this matter and that he too had long been of the personal opinion that a United Nations trusteeship might be the best solution. However, the Chinese Nationalist Government was completely opposed to any such solution and it would therefore be
useful to seek some other formula and in this regard the suggestions of the Philippine Government would be most welcome.
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: ? ?
title: Provisional Memorandum
date: Feb. 15, 1951
quote: Subject to further consideration and subject to further consultation with the interested Parties, the United States contemplates a peace treaty along the following lines: .... Territory: Japan would announce all rights and titles to Korea, Formosa, and the Pescadores ......
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: Bureau of Far Eastern Affairs
title: Memorandum
subject: Meeting with Far East Sub-Committee of Senate Foreign Relations Committee regarding a Japanese Peace Treaty
date: March 19, 1951
quote: ... Senator Smith noted that Article [3] left the disposition of Formosa undetermined. Ambassador Dulles said that provision for the disposition of Formosa by decision of the General Assembly if the Far Eastern Big Four failed to reach agreement had been made in the United States seven-point statement of principles but that this idea had since been abandoned. He recalled that the United States had secured the postponement of the question of Formosa during the General Assembly because there appeared to be a real possibility that the Assembly would recommend turning the island over to the Chinese Communists. This still seemed a likely possibility if the Assembly were given jurisdiction over the problem and it had accordingly been thought advisable to leave the status of Formosa undecided.
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: US Congress
date: May 1951
title: status of Formosa
item: General Douglas MacArthur stated at a US congressional hearing: " . . . . legalistically Formosa is still a part of the Empire of Japan."
(
source: Statement by General Douglas MacArthur, N.Y. Times, May 5, 1951, at A7;
see also Y. Frank Chiang, One-China Policy and Taiwan, 28 Fordham International Law Journal 1, 16, n.72 (2004))
Office/Agency: (Dept. of State)
title: Memo of Conversation
subject: Views of the Government of India on the March 28, 1951 Provisional Draft of the Japanese Peace Treaty
date: May 28, 1951
item: (1) Chapter III of the U.S. draft -- Territory
quote: With respect to Formosa we believe it might be desirable not to exclude the possibility of a UN Trusteeship at some appropriate time. Mr. Kirpalani [Minister Counselor, Embassy of India] inquired as to who would be the Administering power. Mr. Allison [US State Dept.] replied that he did not know the answer to this question at this particular time and added that we must take into consideration the wishes of the Formosan people. Mr. Kirpalani inquired as to whether there was any possibility of our withdrawing recognition from the present [Nationalist Chinese] regime in Formosa. Mr. Allison replied that he knew of no such possibility.
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: Dept. of State
title: Draft Japanese Peace Treaty
date: June 14, 1951
item: Chapter II. Territory
sub-item: Article 2
quote: (b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.
(
title of attachment:) Sakhalin, the Kurile Islands, the Hamomais and Shikotan
quote: It is the United States view, reflected in the treaty, that Japan should be required to renounce its rights in South Sakhalin and the Kuriles but that disposition of these territories should not be made by the treaty. This formula is consistent with that for Formosa, but is based on different considerations. The reason for leaving the disposition of Formosa undetermined is that conflicting interests prevent agreement on what the disposition should be. The reason for leaving the disposition of South Sakhalin and the Kuriles undetermined is that it is considered undesirable that the Soviet Union should have its title to these territories cleared by a treaty which they will almost certainly refuse to sign. The Soviets should not be permitted both to retain the advantages of belligerency and to derive advantages from the treaty.
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: (Dept. of State)
title: Memorandum
date: July __, 1951
subject: draft of a Peace Treaty with Japan
quote: The enclosed draft of a Peace Treaty with Japan and of two Declarations by Japan has been prepared by the United States Government and His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom on the basis of 1) a United States draft treaty, circulated the latter part of March [1951] to the governments of the countries most closely concerned with the war against Japan; 2) an independently prepared United Kingdom draft circulated at about the same time to the British Commonwealth nations, and 3) comments and observations received from the governments concerned in relation to the two preceding drafts.
It is believed that the enclosed draft embodies terms upon which it is generally acceptable to the Allied Powers to make peace with Japan.
item: Chapter II. Territory
sub-item: Article 2
quote: (b) Japan renounces all right, title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores.
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: (Dept. of State)
title: Check list of Problems Relating to China Which Would Be Affected by a Cease-fire or Armistice in Korea
FE - Mr. Merchant
CA -- Mr. Perkins
date: July 5, 1951
quote:
I.
Statement of the Issue: To determine the position of the United States with respect to:
(a) whether the Formosa question should be included on the Agenda of a Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting
(b) our policy respecting the disposition of Formosa if it is decided to include this problem on the agenda of such a meeting.
On June 27, the President of the United States stated that
... "Accordingly, I have ordered the Seventh Fleet to prevent any attack on Formosa. As a corollary of this action I am calling upon the Chinese Government on Formosa to cease all air and sea operations against the mainland. The Seventh Fleet will see that this is done. The determination of the future status of Formosa must await the restoration of security in the Pacific, a peace settlement with Japan, or consideration by the United Nations."
The Chinese National Government announced its acceptance of the neutralization measures respecting Formosa. The Chinese Communist regime protested vigorously, describing these measures as acts of American aggression, and appealed to the United Nations.
During subsequent General Assembly debate, Secretary of State Acheson ..... expressed the belief that the problem of Formosa and the nearly eight million people who inhabit the island should not be settled by force or by unilateral action, and that the international community has a legitimate interest and concern in having this matter settled by peaceful means in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations. He proposed that the General Assembly direct its attention to the solution of this problem under circumstances in which all parties concerned would have a full opportunity to express their views, and would agree to refrain from the use of force until a peaceful and equitable solution was found. The United States asked that the question of Formosa be placed on the agenda of the General Assembly.
In its memorandum supporting this request, the United States Delegation traced the recent history of the island which only a few years before had been used by Japan as a base for aggression in the Pacific area. It recalled that in 1943 the President of the United States, the British Prime Minister and the President of China had stated at Cairo that it was their purpose that Formosa and certain other territories should be restored to the Republic of China. They had reaffirmed this purpose in the terms for Japanese surrender defined at Potsdam on July 26, 1945. These terms had been accepted by Japan, and General Order No. 1 of the Japanese Imperial Headquarters, issued pursuant to the terms of surrender had provided for the surrender of the Japanese forces in Formosa to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek. The formal transfer of Formosa to China, the memorandum pointed out was to be at the conclusion of a peace treaty with Japan [ .... ]
The Assembly placed the matter on its agenda despite objections by [Nationalist] China and the Soviet Union. .....
B.
History of Positions Taken by Each Country Concerned
Formosa was surrendered to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek on October 25, 1945, and since that time the United States and the other Allied Powers have accepted the exercise of Chinese authority over the Island. In the words of Secretary Acheson at his press conference on January 5, 1950, "When Formosa was made a province of China nobody raised any lawyers' doubts about that. That was regarded as in accordance with the commitments".
Like the United States, the British, the French and the Soviets have assumed that China's control over Formosa would be formalized in the treaty of peace with Japan. .....
C.
Agreements Previously Made
By virtue of the political agreement concerning the restoration of Formosa to China reached at Cairo and reaffirmed in the Potsdam Proclamation and in the Instrument of Surrender, it was reasonable to conclude that China should occupy and carry on the administration of Formosa pending the peace settlement with Japan. .....
It is the opinion of the Department's Legal Adviser (Top Secret Memorandum dated January 4, 1950 from Mr. Adrian S. Fisher to Mr. W. Walton Butterworth) "that Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, in accepting the Japanese surrender on Formosa, may have done so not only in his capacity as representative of the Allied Powers but also in his capacity as representative of China, the power which was to undertake interim administration of Formosa, since existing inter-Allied agreements provided that Formosa should be restored to China and that the Japanese surrender of Formosa should be to Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek."
" ... the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation contained a political agreement that Formosa should be restored to China. Japan accepted this in the Instrument of Surrender, and agreed to carry out the provisions of the Potsdam Declaration in good faith, and issue whatever orders and take whatever action may be required by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers or by any other designated representative of the Allied Powers for the purpose of giving effect to that Declaration." Thus, under the Instrument of Surrender, Japan became obligated to take whatever measures were necessary for giving effect to the provisions of the Potsdam Proclamation, including some further formal action indicating that Formosa is transferred to China; the normal place for such formal action would be in a treaty of peace. I do not believe that ... any such formal action had already occurred."
In his memorandum of September 19, 1949 to Ambassador Jessup, concerning the "Legal Status of Formosa", the Legal Adviser made the following statement respecting the breadth of authority granted by the aforementioned inter-Allied agreements:
"It is believed that the statement of the Cairo Conference was at most a declaration of intention with respect to future disposition of certain parts of the Japanese Empire, and that there is nothing in the Potsdam Proclamation, or in its acceptance by the Japanese Emperor, or in the Instrument of Surrender, which purports to make a present cession to China of sovereignty over Formosa. From the language of all of these instruments it appears that future action is contemplated, and the Japanese obligation is to take whatever action which may be required in the future to give effect to the Potsdam Proclamation, and hence to the Cairo Declaration. From the standpoint of accepted international law, any transfer of sovereignty must be upon the basis of a formal treaty or instrument to which the ceding nation is a signatory. 1 Hyde, 358-359; 1 Oppenheim, 500."
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: Dept. of State
title: Memorandum of Conversation
date: July 24, 1951
subject: Japanese Peace Treaty
quote: ... I explained to Mr. Wurth that another of the difficulties we had encountered was the question of which Chinese government should sign the treaty. We had ended by adopting the solution that at the moment neither the Nationalists nor the Communists should sign. Japan could later make such bilateral arrangements with either or both as seemed appropriate. I stressed that, as a general rule, we had tried to keep as many extraneous problems as possible, the question of Formosa, for example, out of the Japanese Treaty.
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: Dept. of State
title: Delegation of the United States of America to the Conference for Conclusion and Signature of Treaty of Peace with Japan, San Francisco, California
subject: Formosa
date: September, 1951
quote: In the Cairo Declaration the U.S., U.K. and China stated their purpose to restore Formosa to the "Republic of China". In the Potsdam Proclamation the U.S., U.K., China and subsequently the U.S.S.R. agreed that "The terms of the Cairo Declaration shall be carried out." In the Surrender Instrument Japan accepted the Potsdam provisions and hence the terms of the Cairo Declaration.
It is the view of the United States that circumstances respecting the disposition of Formosa have so altered since the time of the Cairo and Potsdam Agreements as to necessitate a fundamental reconsideration of the matter. In view of the complicated nature of the problem it is not considered advisable or in any way necessary to attempt such a reconsideration in connection with the Japanese peace treaty. In the opinion of the United States it is sufficient merely to have Japan remove itself from the scene by renouncing its rights and interests in Formosa. Attempts to solve the Formosa problem in the treaty would merely mean indefinite postponement of the settlement, which all agree should not be longer deferred. The treaty with Japan should not be thought of as a vehicle for the solution of unrelated or partially related Far Eastern problems, but the right kind of treaty concluded without further delay can be an important step toward the solution of those problems.
.... No one can say that at some future unpredictable date a return to China would necessarily serve the best interests of the inhabitants, whose welfare, under the Charter of the United Nations, is paramount (Article 73).
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: Senator Tom Connally
title: Japanese Peace Treaty
subject: General Comment and Questions
date: Jan. 17, 1952
quote: It should be noted that the phraseology "Japan renounces all right title and claim" to Formosa, the Pescadores, Sakhalin and the Kuriles is a vague phrasing that contains the germ of future conflicting claims. In the original draft this phraseology was used for Formosa and the Pescadores, while in the case of Sakhalin and the Kuriles they were "ceded to the Soviet Union." On objection of the Chinese Nationalists this was changed. This leaves the final disposition uncertain whereas in the very next paragraph (par. d.) a definite disposition of the Mandates is provided. Why not change paragraph B to read "Japan cedes all right title and claim to Formosa and the Pescadores to the Republic of China," the exact phraseology of the Declaration of Cairo? And delete Paragraph C?
(
source: NARA declassified documents)
Office/Agency: Senate Committee on Foreign Relations
title: Report on the San Francisco Peace Treaty
subject: renunciatory article
date: Feb. 14, 1952
quote: In its Report on the San Francisco Peace Treaty dated February 14, 1952, the Committee stated:
"It is important to remember that Article 2 is a renunciatory article and makes no provision for the power or powers which are to succeed Japan in the possession of and sovereignty over the ceded territory.
"During the negotiation of the Treaty some of the Allied Powers expressed the view that Article 2 of the treaty should not only relieve Japan of its sovereignty over the territories in question but should indicate specifically what disposition was to be made of each of them. The Committee believes, however, that this would have complicated and prolonged the conclusion of the peace .... "
(
source: Starr Memorandum, July 13, 1971)
Comments on Reservations Intended to be Proposed by Senator Jenner
(William E. Jenner, Senator from Indiana)
subject: The Japanese Peace Treaty
date: (1952)
item: Reservation No. 4
quote: Article 21 confirms, by cross reference to Article 14(a)(2) the right to seize and liquidate Japanese property in China. This property was all expropriated six years ago (1946) by the National Government of the Republic of China and the effect of the Treaty is to validate that action.
The second part of the proposed reservation provides that the sovereignty of the Republic of China "shall be deemed to extend to all areas which were part of China at the outbreak of the
late war between Japan and China, including Manchuria, Formosa, and the islands adjacent to Formosa". This reservation would carry into effect the proposals of the Soviet Union. At San Francisco, Gromyko complained that the Treaty "grossly violates the indisputable rights of China to the return of integral parts of Chinese territory; Taiwan (Formosa) and the Pescadores". They want Formosa to be recognized as purely a Chinese internal problem and they want to end any international interests in Formosa which is the basis for continuing United States concern.
It is because of that that the Treaty merely requires Japan to renounce its interests in these islands whithout ending the right of the United States as one of the victorious Allied Powers to continue to concern itself with the ultimate disposition and intermediate status of the islands.
This Treaty handling of the matter was accepted by the Chinese National Government itself, and the alternative now proposed was, after careful study, rejected by United States negotiators with the approval of the Foreign Relations Committee as contrary to the best interests of the United States. We do not want to write ourselves out of Formosa.
(
source: NARA declassified documents)